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I. INTRODUCTION 
The cat’s paw doctrine is an employment discrimination concept 
wherein an employer is held liable for the discriminatory act of a non-firing 
agent when that agent’s act caused another, non-discriminatory agent to fire 
an employee.1  Under agency law, an employer is generally not liable for an 
employee’s actions made outside the scope of the employee’s employment 
and conjunctively views an employee’s intentional torts as employee actions 
 
* J.D., 2018, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Rutgers University. The Author 
thanks his parents, Joyce and Ghassan Nehme, Dean Charles Sullivan, The Seton Hall 
Legislative Journal, and the Author’s cat, Chief Keef, for whom this work is dedicated. 
1  See Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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made outside the scope of employment.2  Under Title VII, discrimination is 
an intentional tort.3  Therefore, employees can generally discriminate against 
other employees without imputing liability to the employer under Title VII.  
However, agency law also provides exceptions to this general rule when 
employees are somehow assisted by the employer in carrying out the 
intentional tort.  Title VII, adopting agency law’s general rule, also adopts 
its exceptions.  Evolving from a judicial analysis of these agency exceptions, 
the cat’s paw doctrine is an important Title VII concept which stretches 
employer liability to cover employees indirectly empowered to commit 
discriminatory actions against their fellow employees. 
Discrimination is an intentional tort.4  For an employer to be liable, the 
employer or one of his agents must take an adverse employment action with 
the intent to discriminate, which usually requires actions by a 
“decisionmaker.”  Consider the following scenario: 
Steve is a male salesman for the Lucky Shoe Company.  Steve’s 
supervisor, Bob, distrusts male salesmen because he believes they 
are lazy.  Bob falsely reports to his supervisor, Kevin, that Steve 
has not been meeting his quota.  Kevin relies on Bob’s report and 
fires Steve for missing the quota.  Kevin did not know Steve was 
a man, or that Bob hated men, when he fired him.  Steve sues the 
Lucky Shoe Company for discriminating against him. 
Proponents of the cat’s paw theory of liability argue that the Lucky 
Shoe Company should be held liable because Steve’s discriminatory 
supervisor, Bob, used the decision-maker, Kevin, as a conduit for his 
discriminatory intent.  Nearly every circuit had adopted a form of 
supervisory cat’s paw liability before the Supreme Court in Staub v. Proctor 
Hospital.5 
Although the Supreme Court recognized cat’s paw liability in Staub, 
the Court limited the ruling to imputing a supervisor’s discriminatory actions 
and intent to the employer, even though the decision-maker did not have a 
discriminatory motive.6  The Court “express[ed] no view as to whether the 
employer would be liable if a co-worker, rather than a supervisor, committed 
a discriminatory act that influenced the ultimate employment decision.”7 
Recently, several circuits have analyzed Staub to determine whether 
cat’s paw liability can apply to co-workers: Velázquez-Perez v. Developers 
Diversified Realty Corp. in the First Circuit and Vasquez v. Empress 
 
 2   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
 3  See 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2016). 
 4  Id. 
 5  Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011). 
 6  Id. at 422 n. 4. 
 7  Id. 
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Ambulance Serv. in the Second Circuit.  Both cases applied cat’s paw 
liability to co-workers.8 
Although the influence for this recent cat’s paw case law should 
primarily be the Supreme Court ruling in Staub, both the First and Second 
Circuit rely on Staub’s interplay with the generally restrictive ruling (in the 
context of the hostile workplace framework) of Vance v. Ball State 
University.9  Vance redefines the term “supervisor” for purposes of vicarious 
liability under Title VII’s hostile work environment (hereinafter “Ellerth”) 
framework to include only those employees that were “empowered by the 
employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim.”10  
Thereafter, “supervisors” were defined as employees expressly given the 
power to hire, fire, demote, promote, or take any similar significant 
employment action.11  Directly applied to the cat’s paw doctrine, Vance 
would seem to render Staub, if not superfluous, at least limited in scope 
because cat’s paw liability is not needed when an empowered agent takes an 
adverse action with the requisite animus.  Rather, the theory holds employers 
liable despite the absence of empowered agents exhibiting animus.  Read 
alongside Vance, Staub now seems to hold employers liable for a 
supervisor’s actions only when the supervisor, already expressly empowered 
to make tangible employment decisions relating to a particular employee, 
heavily influences another supervisor’s tangible employment decision that 
affects that employee. 
Despite this reading, the First and Second Circuits’ recent co-worker 
cat’s paw expansion attempts to salvage some remaining precedential value 
from Staub.  However, this article will argue that both Vazquez and 
Velazquez were wrongly decided because applying the Vance supervisor to 
the independently developed cat’s paw doctrine increases Ellerth’s 
significance far beyond its intended scope.  The Vasquez and Velazquez cat’s 
paws, in implicitly and explicitly adopting the Ellerth framework to form the 
basis for co-worker cat’s paw liability, have irreparably limited cat’s paw 
liability. 
This article will argue that Vasquez and Velazquez were wrongly 
decided and that any further attempt to reconcile Vance with Staub is both 
incorrect and unnecessary.  Part II of this article will discuss the statutory 
evolution of employment discrimination law and the common law evolution 
 
 8  Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Servs., 835 F.3d 267, 274 (2d Cir. 2016); Velázquez-
Pérez v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., 753 F.3d 265, 274 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 9  Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421 (2013); see Velázquez-Perez, 753 F.3d at 273–
74 (holding that co-worker cat’s paw liability must be based on the negligence standard 
espoused by Vance). 
 10  Vance, 570 U.S. at 431. 
 11  Id. 
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of the cat’s paw doctrine, comparing the development of the cat’s paw theory 
of liability with the development of the Ellerth framework, each culminating 
in their respective Supreme Court decisions in Staub and Vance.  Part III 
analyzes the effect of the Supreme Court decisions in Staub and Vance on 
the cat’s paw doctrine and Ellerth framework.  Part IV will argue that recent 
decisions among the circuits have misinterpreted the interplay between these 
decisions. 
This article concludes by explaining that reliance on the Ellerth 
framework, for the purpose of cat’s paw liability, should be limited to 
acknowledgment that negligence is a valid basis for imposing liability on an 
employer for the acts of his or her agents.  Following an examination of the 
relevant statutes and background law, this article will show the following: 
(1) the Vance “supervisor” must be limited to the Ellerth framework; (2) 
cat’s paw liability cannot support a Vance “supervisor;” and (3) the cat’s paw 
theory is better served by continuing the proximate cause standard advanced 
in Staub. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CAT’S PAW DOCTRINE 
A. An Overview of Employment Discrimination in the United States 
Historically, at-will employment has been the law in the United 
States.12  An employer may terminate employment for good reason, bad 
reason, or no reason at all.13  Few common law exceptions to the at-will 
doctrine exist. 
Therefore, wrongfully discharged employees often turn to statutory 
exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine.  Numerous federal and state 
statutes provide relief for discriminatory employment actions.14  For 
example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful to 
discriminate in employment actions based on “race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”15  The prevalence of Title VII as a weapon against 
employment discrimination is undeniable.  In 2015 alone, there were 89,385 
individual Title VII charge filings made to the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).16 
 
 12  Richard A. Lord, The At-Will Relationship in the 21st Century: A Consideration of 
Consideration, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 707, 707 (2006). 
 13  Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 606 (2008). 
 14  See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e (2016); Equal Rights 
Under the Law, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1981 (2016); Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 
12101 (2016); see also Cyndi M. Benedict et al., Employment and Labor Law, 52 SMU L. 
REV. 1001, 1043, 1058, 1078 (1999) (citing numerous federal statutory exceptions to the at-
will doctrine). 
 15  42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 16  Charge Statistics, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/ 
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Title VII rose out of the struggle against segregation in the mid-20th 
century.  President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
to combat segregation in public accommodations and all programs funded 
by the federal government.17  Initially, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not 
include what is now Title VII, but Congress recognized that providing equal 
employment opportunities was vital to the bill’s purpose.18  The bill also 
reflected the concern that employment discrimination was an economic 
waste that needed to be remedied.19  Over time, it became clear that federal 
courts were to have the vanguard role in enforcing the bill’s provisions and 
stamping out employment discrimination.20  Eventually, Congress outlawed 
other forms of discrimination, such as age and disability discrimination, by 
passing statutes worded similarly to Title VII.21 
For the purpose of Title VII, employers include “a person engaged in 
an industry affecting commerce . . . and any agent of such a person.”22  
Courts originally interpreted the “any agent” clause as a source of individual 
liability against discriminating agents of employers23  Any supervisory agent 
of an employer, such as a hiring manager, could be held liable under Title 
VII for their discriminatory acts.24  However, federal courts eventually 
shifted away from this interpretation in favor of reading the “any agent” 
clause as espousing the congressional desire to apply agency principles to 
determine an employer’s vicarious liability.25  After this reinterpretation, 
individual liability for agents decreased.26  Instead, courts began to apply 
agency principles to determine whether liability is imputed onto employers 
whose employees commit discrimination.27 
The agency principles predominantly used to analyze Title VII 
vicarious liability are found in the Second Restatement of Agency: 
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants 
committed while acting in the scope of their employment. 
 
eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Dec. 17, 2016) (receiving employee 
request to proceed with a lawsuit). 
 17  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2. 
 18  Thelma L. Harmon, What’s My Line: Supervisor or Co-Worker?, 24 TEMP. POL. & 
C.R. L. REV. 43, 45–46 (2014). 
 19  Id. at 46. 
 20  Id. at 47. 
 21  See 2 U.S.C.S. § 1311 (2016). 
 22  42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e(b) (2016) (emphasis added). 
 23  See, e.g., Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 1986); Bridges v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 800 F. Supp. 1172, 1179–80 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 24  See, e.g., Rodgers, 791 F.2d at 442–43. 
 25  See Meritor Sav. Bank, v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). 
 26  See Henry Ting, Who’s the Boss?: Personal Liability Under Title VII and the ADEA, 
5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 515, 522 (1996). 
 27  See id. 
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(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants 
acting outside the scope of their employment, unless: 
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or 
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or 
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or 
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the 
principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he 
was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency 
relation.28 
Two separate sources of employer liability emerged from these agency 
principles: hostile work environment and cat’s paw liability.  Although these 
theories evolved separately, their common inspiration has caused their 
merger in modern legal analysis. 
B. A Brief History of the Title VII Hostile Work Environment 
Framework 
General employment discrimination cases deal with an employer’s 
liability for tangible employment actions, such as hirings, firings, or 
demotions.  However, Title VII also protects individuals from being 
discriminated against in the terms and conditions of their employment.29  
Because harassment, notably sexual harassment, is so pervasive within the 
employment context, courts needed to determine how to approach cases 
where an individual was discriminatorily deprived of a harassment-free 
workplace but was not the target of an adverse, tangible employment action. 
Eventually, the Supreme Court cemented a framework for establishing 
employer liability for hostile work environments in the 1998 twin cases: 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton30 and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth.31  The 
Court held that an employer is vicariously liable when a supervisor creates 
an actionably hostile work environment.32  However, the employer has a 
defense if it did not take a tangible employment action and must show that: 
(a) it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually 
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed 
to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by 
the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”33 
Nonetheless, when a co-worker creates a hostile work environment, the 
employer is liable only if it was negligent in failing to prevent the tortious 
 
 28  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (AM.  LAW  INST. 1958). 
 29  42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2016). 
 30  Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 31  Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 32  Id. at 765. 
 33  Id. 
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conduct.34  The Court created this co-worker/supervisor dichotomy by 
parsing through vicarious liability in agency law.  First, the Court began with 
the general idea that sexual harassment, absent any tangible employment 
action, “is not conduct within the scope of employment.”35  Employers do 
not want their supervisors sexually harassing employees during work hours. 
Since employers are not generally liable for employee torts committed 
outside the scope of employment, the Court next examined whether there 
was an applicable exception to the rule.36  After summarily dismissing the 
Second Restatement of Agency section 219(a) and (c) as irrelevant to the 
analysis, the Court held that employers should be held liable for their 
supervisors’ sexual harassment under section 219(d) (aided in accomplishing 
the tort by the existence of the agency relation) based on the general 
proposition that only “a supervisor, or other person acting with the authority 
of the company” can cause a direct economic injury stemming from a 
tangible employment action.37  Only a supervisor can fire you, demote you, 
or dock your pay.38  A supervisor’s discriminatory harassment takes on a 
more sinister tone because the agency relationship intrinsically supports it. 
Because a supervisor’s offensive conduct is less likely to be reported 
and more likely to make an employee’s work environment uncomfortable, 
the Court held that employers should be held vicariously liable when 
supervisors create a hostile work environment.39  Employers, however, are 
not automatically liable when co-workers create a hostile work environment 
absent employer negligence.40 
C. The Evolution of Title VII Cat’s Paw Liability 
The co-worker/supervisor dichotomy also presented itself in the 
evolution of the cat’s paw framework, although most circuits based the cat’s 
paw doctrine on an entirely different element of the “supervisory” 
relationship.41  Cat’s paw liability is a causation theory that holds an 
employer liable “when a supervisor with a discriminatory motive influences, 
but does not make, an adverse employment decision against a fellow 
 
 34  See id. at 758–59 (“Negligence sets a minimum standard for employer liability under 
Title VII.”). 
 35  Id. at 757. 
 36  Id. at 758. 
 37  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762.  
 38  Id.  
 39  Id. at 765. 
 40  Id. at 762. 
 41  Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting how supervisory 
employees more readily utilize an employer’s authority when they influence employment 
decisions than when they are harassing employees). 
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employee.”42  The cat’s paw derives its name from an Aesop fable wherein 
a wily monkey convinces a cat to grab chestnuts from a roaring fire.43  The 
monkey eats the chestnuts as the cat retrieves them, and the cat is left with 
nothing but a burnt paw for his trouble.44 
The 1990 case, Shager v. Upjohn Company, injected this myth into the 
lexicon of employment law.45  Upjohn involved an employment committee 
that fired a salesman, Shager, based on his poor sales and supervisor 
reports.46  Unbeknown to the committee, Shager’s supervisor had 
purposefully marginalized Shager’s performance due to the supervisor’s 
own biased views towards older workers like Shager.47  Judge Richard 
Posner held that if the employment committee acted as the conduit for the 
supervisor’s discriminatory animus, the employer could be held liable for the 
supervisor’s discriminatory motivation.48  In empowering the employee’s 
discriminatory intent, the employer played the gullible cat to the 
discriminatory supervisor’s wily monkey and allowed the former employee 
to burn, or in this case, sue the company. 
After Upjohn, the cat’s paw theory of liability spread throughout the 
courts.49  Nearly every circuit adopted a form of subordinate bias liability.50  
 
 42  John S. Collins, Another Hairball for Employers? “Cat’s Paw” Liability for the 
Discriminatory Acts of Co-Workers After Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 908, 
909 (2012). 
 43  THE MONKEY AND THE CAT (AESOP FOR CHILDREN, 1919), http://mythfolklore.net/ 
aesopica/ milowinter/61.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2016). 
 44  Id. 
 45  Upjohn, 913 F.2d at 405. 
 46  Id. at 400. 
 47  Id. 
 48  Id. at 405. 
 49  Stephen F. Befort & Alison L. Olig, Within the Grasp of the Cat’s Paw: Delineating 
the Scope of Subordinate Bias Liability Under Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes, 60 S.C. 
L. Rev. 383, 385–86 (2008) (“[s]ince 1990, every federal circuit court of appeals, as well as 
the Supreme Court, have endorsed the notion that subordinate bias may be a basis for imputing 
liability to an employer in appropriate circumstances.”). 
 50  See, e.g., Potence v. Hazleton Area Sch. Dist., 357 F.3d 366, 370 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(establishing a cat’s paw liability similar to the Second Circuit); Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 
572, 583 (5th Cir. 2003) (establishing a two-part test for subordinate bias liability); EEOC v. 
Liberal R-II Sch. Dist., 314 F.3d 920, 926 (8th Cir. 2002) (establishing a cat’s paw liability 
test similar to the one established by the Second Circuit); Rose v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 257 
F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2001) (establishing that cat’s paw liability exists in the Second Circuit 
when an employee has significant influence over the decision-making process); Bergene v. 
Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(establishing cat’s paw liability when a supervisor was involved in the final decision-making 
process); English v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 248 F.3d 1002, 1011 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding an 
identical definition of cat’s paw liability as the Eleventh Circuit); Maarouf v. Walker Mfg. 
Co., 210 F.3d 750, 752 (7th Cir. 2000) (establishing a form of proximate cause liability in the 
Seventh Circuit); Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(adopting cat’s paw liability in cases where a biased supervisor’s recommendation is followed 
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However, key differences emerged among the circuits as they developed 
their theories of cat’s paw liability.  Notably, the circuits differed on the 
requisite causal link between a supervisor’s discriminatory action and the 
eventual adverse employment action, along with the extent to which an 
independent investigation insulated the employer from liability.51 
The First, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits implemented a lenient causation 
standard.52  These circuits adopted a standard that considered whether 
discriminatory animus tainted the decision-making process.53  It was enough 
that the supervisor had “influence or leverage over the official decision-
maker.”54 
The majority of circuits forged stricter answers to the causation 
requirement.  This approach required more than a simple discriminatory 
influence but did not require the supervisor to practically become the 
decision-maker.55  In these circuits, a claim would survive summary 
judgment if the “biased supervisor played a role in the decisionmaking 
process.”56  The Tenth Circuit required a causal connection between the 
supervisor’s “reports, recommendations, and actions” and the final 
employment decision.57  The Sixth Circuit applied the same standard.58 
The Fourth Circuit embraced the strictest standard.59  In Hill v. 
Lockheed Martin,60 the Fourth Circuit held that an employer is liable for the 
discriminatory actions of a supervisor only when a plaintiff shows that the 
supervisor “was the one ‘principally responsible’ for, or the ‘actual 
decisionmaker’ behind, the action.”61  In other words, it does not matter that 
a supervisor “had a substantial influence on the ultimate decision or . . . 
played a role, even a significant one, in the adverse employment decision.”62 
At its core, the Fourth Circuit was concerned with the Ellerth Court’s 
application of general agency principles determining vicarious liability.  The 
Fourth Circuit believed supervisors were acting within the scope of their 
 
without a follow-up investigation); Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 
344, 355 (6th Cir. 1998) (establishing a causal nexus test for cat’s paw liability).  
 51  See Abby Bochenek, The Cat’s Revenge: Individual Liability Under the Cat’s Paw 
Doctrine, 8 SEVENTH CIR. REV. 120, 125 (2012). 
 52  See Sean Ratliff, Comment, Independent Investigations: An Inequitable Out for 
Employers in Cat’s Paw Cases, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 255, 260 (2009). 
 53  See Cariglia v. Hertz Equip. Rental Corp., 363 F.3d 77, 88 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 54  Gee v. Principi, 289 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 55  Ratliff, supra note 52, at 268. 
 56  Id. 
 57  EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 488 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 58  Noble v. Brinker Int’l, Inc., 391 F.3d 715, 723–24 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 59  Ratliff, supra note 52, at 263. 
 60  Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 61  Id. at 288–89. 
 62  Id. at 291. 
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employment and, thus, subjecting their employers to vicarious liability only 
when specifically empowered to make employment decisions.63  Focusing 
on Ellerth’s dicta, stating that “only a supervisor can cause [tangible 
employment actions],” the Fourth Circuit refused to hold Lockheed Martin 
liable for its employee’s action when the employer had not expressly granted 
the employee any decision-making authority.64 
Other circuits ignored the Supreme Court’s Ellerth distinction, 
believing that the court could impute an agent’s discriminatory motives to 
the final decision-maker if the plaintiff established a causal link.65  This 
rendered any examination of agency principles unnecessary. 
The Supreme Court did not resolve the cat’s paw circuit split until 2011 
in Staub v. Proctor Hospital.66  The Seventh Circuit had affirmed an 
employer’s summary judgment motion on appeal, concluding that an 
employer’s independent investigation cut off liability for its supervisor’s 
discriminatory acts.67  The plaintiff appealed, and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.68  In the ensuing decision, the Supreme Court adopted cat’s paw 
liability, but it was not in a form that was familiar to any of the circuits. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT TAKES ACTION 
A. Staub:  The Supreme Court Adopts the Cat’s Paw 
Vincent Staub was a U.S. Army Reservist who was required to attend 
drill camp one weekend per month and train full-time for two to three weeks 
a year.69  His immediate supervisor, Janice Mullaly, and her supervisor, 
Michael Korenchuk, believed that Staub’s Reservist responsibilities were a 
waste of time and a drain on the company.70  Over the course of Staub’s 
employment, Mullaly made it clear that she was “out to get him” and once 
disciplined him under dubious circumstances.71 
On April 2, 2004, one of Staub’s co-workers complained to a human 
resources officer, Linda Buck, about Staub’s frequent unavailability.72  Buck 
responded by directing Korenchuck and Mullaly to create a plan to solve 
Staub’s “availability” problems.73  Three weeks later Korenchuk informed 
 
 63  Id.  
 64  Id. 
 65  Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 355 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 66  Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (2011). 
 67  Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 656 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 562 U.S. 411 (2011). 
 68  Staub, 559 U.S. at 1066. 
 69  Id. at 413–14.  
 70  Id. at 414. 
 71  Id. 
 72  Id. 
 73  Id. 
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Buck that Staub had left his desk without informing a supervisor.74  Although 
Staub contended that he had left Korenchuk a voice-message detailing his 
absence, Buck relied on Korenchuk’s accusation, as well as Mullaly’s 
history of discipline, and fired Staub.75  Staub challenged his firing through 
the grievance process, claiming that Mullaly had fabricated his previous 
demerits, but Staub was unsuccessful.76 
Staub subsequently brought suit under the Uniformed Services 
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA),77 claiming 
that Buck fired him due to discriminatory animus toward his armed service 
obligations.78  A jury decided in Staub’s favor, finding that Staub’s military 
status was “a motivating factor in Proctor Hospital’s decision to discharge 
him.”79  The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that cat’s paw liability was 
appropriate only in cases where the biased supervisor exercised “such 
‘singular influence’ over the decisionmaker that the decision to terminate 
was the product of ‘blind reliance.’”80  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.81 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, began by noting how similarly 
Title VII and the USERRA are constructed.82  Specifically, the USERRA 
prohibits employer actions if “the person’s membership [in the armed 
forces] . . . is a motivating factor in the employer’s action, unless the 
employer can prove that the action would have been taken in the absence of 
such membership.”83  Title VII prohibits employer actions when “race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment 
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”84 
As the Court noted, the question of liability revolved around the 
meaning of the phrase, “motivating factor,” in the employment action.85  
Staub argued that the supervisors, Mullaly and Korenchuck, were 
discriminatorily motivated in filing unfavorable entries in his record, 
sufficing to establish a violation of USERRA.86  However, the Court quickly 
dismissed the argument, observing that, while filing false reports was an 
 
 74  Staub, 559 U.S. at 414. 
 75  Id. at 414–15. 
 76  Id. at 415. 
 77  Id. 
 78  Id. 
 79  Id. 
 80  Staub, 559 U.S. at 415–16.  
 81  Id. 413–14. 
 82  Id. at 417. 
 83  38 U.S.C.S. § 4311(c)(1) (1994). 
 84  42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(m) (2016). 
 85  Staub, 562 U.S. at 417. 
 86  Id. 
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employment action, it was not a significant employment action that would 
allow the Court to impute liability to the employer under USERRA.87  
Staub’s firing was the significant employment action.88  The Court further 
rejected the notion that Korenchuk and Mullaly’s discriminatory motive 
could be imputed to Buck’s non-discriminatory action, citing the statutory 
language requirement that “discrimination be ‘a motivating factor’ in the 
adverse action.”89 
The Court continued by summarily dismissing Proctor Hospital’s 
interpretations of cat’s paw liability.  Proctor Hospital argued that a violation 
of USERRA occurs only when the supervisor is the de facto decision-
maker.90  In essence, Proctor Hospital was arguing for the Fourth Circuit’s 
strict causation standard.  The Court found such a strict test unnecessary.91  
This, in essence, dismissed the circuit courts’ lenient and strict standards for 
imposing subordinate bias liability.92  Instead, the Court defined cat’s paw 
liability as follows: “If a supervisor performs an act motivated by 
antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse 
employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate 
employment action, then the employer is liable under USERRA.”93  Under 
this rule, an independent investigation does not shield an employer from 
liability unless it breaks the causal connections between the supervisor’s 
discriminatory act and the eventual employment action.94 
The Supreme Court specifically left unaddressed the possibility of a co-
worker cat’s paw liability case, only remarking that traditional agency law 
must impute liability to the employer  for the acts of a discriminatorily 
motivated agent.95  Neither did the Court sufficiently define “supervisor,” 
noting only that both cat’s paw supervisors and unbiased decision-makers 
“possessed supervisory authority delegated by their employer and exercised 
it in the interest of their employer.”96  Mulally and Korenchuk acted “within 
the scope of their employment” when they reprimanded Staub for violating 
company rules.97 
 
 87  Id. at 417–18. 
 88  Id. 
 89  Id. at 418 (emphasis omitted). 
 90  Id. at 419. 
 91  Staub, 562 U.S. at 419. 
 92  See id. at 417–19 (dismissing petitioner’s argument that discriminatory intent on the 
part of a supervisor could qualify as a “motivating factor,” while simultaneously dismissing 
respondent’s argument that cat’s paw liability requires the biased supervisor to be the de facto 
decision-maker). 
 93  Id. at 422 (emphasis omitted). 
 94  Id. at 421. 
 95  Id. at 422 n.4. 
 96  Id. at 422. 
 97  Id. at 422–23. 
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Vance:  The Supreme Court Tightens the Ellerth Framework 
Three years later, the Court decided an Ellerth hostile work 
environment case, Vance v. Ball State University,98 which many believed 
would answer some of the questions Staub had left unresolved.  Maetta 
Vance, an African-American woman, worked as a Ball State University 
(“BSU”) caterer for over seventeen years.99  Saundra Davis was also 
employed as a BSU caterer but at no point had the power to “hire, fire, 
demote, promote, transfer, or discipline Vance.”100  Vance alleged that Davis 
made her feel threatened at work by engaging in racially discriminatory 
actions such as “glaring at her, slamming pots and pans around her, and 
intimidating her.”101  Vance eventually filed charges of racial harassment and 
discrimination against BSU, alleging that BSU was liable for the creation of 
a racially hostile work environment because Davis was Vance’s 
supervisor.102 
The Court responded to this weak case for liability under the supervisor 
rubric and established a bright-line rule that would allow lower-court judges 
to easily determine when an employer is liable for a supervisor’s hostile work 
environment.103  “An employee is a ‘supervisor’ for purposes of vicarious 
liability under Title VII if he or she is empowered by the employer to take 
tangible employment actions against the victim.”104  A tangible employment 
action causes a “significant change in employment status such as hiring, 
firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different 
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”105 
As established by the Ellerth framework, an employer is strictly liable 
for a supervisor’s discrimination if it culminates in a “tangible employment 
action.”106  Otherwise, an employer may escape liability by “establishing, as 
an affirmative defense, that (1) the employer exercised reasonable care to 
prevent and correct any harassing behavior and (2) the plaintiff unreasonably 
failed to take advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities that the 
employer provided.”107  Employees who are not supervisors are co-
workers.108  By contrast, an employer is responsible for the discriminatory 
actions of a co-worker only if the employer is “negligent in controlling 
 
 98  Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421 (2013). 
 99  Id. 
 100  Id. 
 101  Id. 
 102  Id. at 425. 
 103  See id. at 451 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting); Id. at 424. 
 104  Vance, 570 U.S. at 424. 
 105  Id. at 421 (quoting Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)). 
 106  Id. at 424. 
 107  Id. 
 108  Id. 
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working conditions.”109 
The petitioner argued that no reading of the Ellerth framework 
suggested the majority’s strict supervisor definition.110  However, the 
majority rejected this argument, claiming supervisory status was not a 
contested issue in the previous cases, and the Court was never asked to define 
it.111  The Court emphasized that the Ellerth framework mandated a clear 
definition of the term “supervisor.”112  However, the Court also posited that 
employers who rely on employees to provide them with the facts of an 
ultimate firing are, in essence, giving the employees supervisory authority.113  
“If an employer does attempt to confine decisionmaking power to a small 
number of individuals, those individuals will have a limited ability to 
exercise independent discretion when making decisions and will likely rely 
on other workers who actually interact with the affected employee.”114  This 
language would form the basis for the First and Second Circuits’ future 
attempts at synthesizing Staub and Vance.115 
B. Synthesis:  The Co-Worker Cat’s Paw Doctrine 
Following Vance, the various circuits were left without clarification as 
to the proper application of the “supervisor” definition to cat’s paw 
liability.116  Vance was decided without mentioning cat’s paw liability, but it 
did seemingly impose a strict supervisor definition on the entire Title VII 
jurisprudence.  Eventually, both the First and Second Circuits published 
opinions attempting to reconcile Vance with Staub.117 
In Velázquez-Pérez, the First Circuit found “limited utility” in a 
distinction between Vance hostile workplace claims and the quid pro quo 
case presently before it.118 The First Circuit concluded that a jilted human 
resources representative, Martinez, was not Velázquez-Pérez’s supervisor, 
despite her attempt at retaliation, which consisted of a thorough and 
 
 109  Id. 
 110  Vance, 570 U.S. at 436. 
 111  Id. at 438. 
 112  Id. at 432 (“[T]he framework set out in Ellerth and Faragher presupposes a clear 
distinction between supervisors and co-workers.”). 
 113  Id. at 447. 
 114  Id. 
 115  See Velázquez-Pérez v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., 753 F.3d 265, 272 (1st 
Cir. 2014); Kramer v. Wasatch Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 743 F.3d 726, 738 (10th Cir. 2014); see 
also Burlington v. News Corp., 55 F. Supp. 3d 723, 735 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
 116  See Shazor v. Prof’l Transit Mgmt., 744 F.3d 948, 955–56 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 117  Velázquez-Pérez, 753 F.3d at 265; Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Servs., 835 F.3d 
267 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 118  Velázquez-Pérez, 753 F.3d at 273 (explaining that Vance defines quid pro quo claims 
to include claims where employers or their agents take a tangible employment action against 
an employee who does not offer sexual favors).  
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persistent lobbying effort to get him fired.119  Recognizing that the human 
resources representative was not his supervisor, the court  held that 
Velázquez-Pérez’s employer could still be held liable because the employer 
was negligent in allowing Martinez’s persistent and transparent lobbying 
efforts to succeed.120  The First Circuit’s opinion synthesized Vance and 
Staub.  Acknowledging that Vance raised the bar for supervisors, the panel 
nevertheless held that employers could also be held liable under a co-worker 
cat’s paw theory of liability if they were negligent in allowing the 
discriminatory act to cause an adverse employment action.121  The First 
Circuit based this co-worker cat’s paw theory on the baseline of negligence 
established in the Ellerth framework.122 
In Vasquez, the Second Circuit concluded that a discriminating 
employee, Gray, was considered a co-worker under Title VII, after Gray’s 
attempt to cover-up his sexual harassment of a fellow employee, Vazquez, 
led to Vazquez’s firing.123  Nevertheless, while citing to Velázquez-Pérez, 
the court found that the employer, Empress, was liable under a co-worker 
cat’s paw theory of liability.124  The Second Circuit held that “an employer 
may be held liable for an employee’s animus under a ‘cat’s paw’ theory, 
regardless of the employee’s role within the organization, if the employer’s 
own negligence gives effect to the employee’s animus and causes the victim 
to suffer an adverse employment action.”125  Interestingly, the Second Circuit 
did not cite Vance when defining the term “supervisor,” nor did the court  
question the co-worker status of the discriminatory employee.  However, the 
Second Circuit did rely on the Ellerth framework to justify the imposition of 
a negligence standard upon co-worker cat’s paw liability.126  Furthermore, 
the court concurred with the Velázquez-Pérez holding and cited that holding 
in forming its own co-worker cat’s paw doctrine.127 
The Vance supervisor question operates as the backdrop of both 
circuits’ opinions, albeit more explicitly in Velázquez-Pérez than in 
Vasquez.128  Although Vance never explicitly mentions Staub, its language 
 
 119  Id. at 271–73 (“That she was successful may show that she was a formidable adversary 
as a coworker . . . but it does not make her Velázquez’s supervisor as defined in Vance.”). 
 120  Id. at 274.  
 121  Id. at 273–74. 
 122  See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 446–47 (2013) (explaining that 
“negligence provides adequate protection for the majority of tort cases”). 
 123  Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Servs., 835 F.3d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 124  Id. at 276. 
 125  Id. 
 126  Id. at 273–74. 
 127  Id. at 274. 
 128  Id.; Velázquez-Pérez v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., 753 F.3d 265, 273 (1st 
Cir. 2014). 
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suggests a broad interpretation “to all forms of ‘unlawful harassment’” and 
an end to the separation of the harassment framework from other 
discrimination cases.129  In step with this broad interpretation, the Vance 
supervisor has seemingly entrenched itself in any cat’s paw analysis of 
retaliation claims in the Second Circuit.130  Given that retaliation claims have 
become the most frequently filed charge with the EEOC in recent years, a 
sensible framework for the application of cat’s paw liability to retaliation 
claims is essential.131  Because a broad application of the Vance supervisor 
to cat’s paw liability limits the ability of the cat’s paw doctrine to function 
as intended, the holdings in Vasquez and Velázquez must not be narrowly 
followed. 
IV. FALLOUT:  HOW THE CO-WORKER CAT’S PAW DIMINISHES THE 
DOCTRINE 
A. The Difference Between a Vance and Staub Supervisor 
“Supervisor” is not a statutory term.132  The workplace harassment 
framework adopted the term to denote employees whose actions imputed 
vicarious liability onto their employers.133  Generally, the toxicity of a 
worker’s environment and the power of a harasser have a direct, positive 
relationship.134  A supervisor capable of firing a worker can poison the 
worker’s work environment more effectively than an arbitrary person on the 
street, or even the person in the parallel cubicle.  “A co-worker can break a 
co-worker’s arm as easily as a supervisor.  .  .  .  [b]ut one co-worker (absent 
some elaborate scheme) cannot dock another’s pay, nor can one co-worker 
demote another.”135 
With this in mind, the Supreme Court adopted the Ellerth framework 
under the general proposition that “only a supervisor, or other person acting 
with the authority of the company, can cause [tangible employment 
decisions].”136  A supervisor’s threat is backed by his or her role in the 
 
 129  Velázquez-Pérez, 753 F.3d at 273 (citing Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 432 
(2013)). 
 130  See Campbell v. Nat’l Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., 723 F. App’x 74, 76 (2d Cir. 2018); 
Moore v. Conn. Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:13-cv-01160, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47129, at *4–5 
(D. Conn. Mar. 22, 2018). 
 131  See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 454 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 8th ed. 2013). 
 132  Vance, 570 U.S. at 436.  
 133  Id. 
 134  See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998) (“On the one hand, a 
supervisor’s power and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular 
threatening character, and in this sense, a supervisor always is aided by the agency relation.”). 
 135  Id. at 762. 
 136  Id. 
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company.  The supervisor can fire or demote you.  For that reason, the 
harassing behavior is implicitly more toxic, and it was this toxicity that the 
Supreme Court sought to address by holding employers presumptively liable 
when a “supervisor” created a hostile work environment.137  The Ellerth 
Court needed to address sexual harassment, and its decision is steeped in 
judicial economy.  The Ellerth supervisor is simply a “term of art” meant to 
effectuate a sexual harassment framework that employers could follow to 
limit liability. 
The definition of “supervisor” under cat’s paw liability necessarily 
evolved separately.  The cat’s paw doctrine recognized that employees 
without express authority to take tangible employment actions still had 
implied authority and the ability to cause tangible employment actions.138  
As Judge Posner succinctly stated, “[c]oncern with the futility of derivative 
liability is absent where the challenged action is not harassment, whether on 
sexual or other grounds, by a fellow employee but discharge by a supervisory 
employee.”139  Employers typically rely on reports and opinions in making 
tangible employment decisions, regardless of whether or not the person in 
question is a “supervisor.”140  If an employer can be held liable exclusively 
for discriminatory actions taken by employees with express authority, 
employers can shield themselves from liability by creating a system wherein 
disassociated managers approve discriminatory recommendations without 
facing any burden to investigate the claims.141  Consequently, when the 
circuits developed their own cat’s paw doctrines, most based their doctrines 
around theories of causation wherein the employer had, in effect, delegated 
some authority to the non-decision-making supervisor.142  In these cases, the 
“elaborate scheme” conjectured in Ellerth is made significantly more simple 
through the employer’s delegation of authority.143 
The Court decided Staub in light of this history.  Justice Scalia 
explicitly rebuffed the Ellerth supervisor’s application to cat’s paw, noting 
that reliance “on facts provided by the biased supervisor—as is necessary in 
any case of cat’s-paw liability . . . will have effectively delegated the 
factfinding portion of the investigation to the biased supervisor.”144  While 
the harassment framework targets a harassing employee’s implied ability to 
take an employment action, cat’s paw liability concerns an employee’s 
 
 137  Id. 
 138  See Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 139  Id. at 404. 
 140  Harmon, supra note 18, at 61. 
 141  EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 486 (10th Cir. 2006) 
 142  Id. at 487–88. 
 143  See, e.g., id.; Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 413–15 (2011). 
 144  Staub, 562 U.S. at 421.  
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influence over the information that forms the backdrop to that action.  With 
cat’s paw liability, the employee has “perform[ed] an act motivated by 
[discriminatory] animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an 
adverse employment action,” and the act in fact does cause an adverse 
employment action.145  The power to fire has necessarily been delegated, 
whether victims or employers know it or not. 
B. Adopting Vance Supervisors Into the Cat’s Paw Framework 
Wrongly Makes A Hastily Constructed Framework’s Dicta the 
Focal Point of Employment Law 
The Ellerth decision was a brazen attempt at judicial lawmaking.  
Believing that the lower courts needed exacting guidance in applying agency 
law to hostile work environment cases, the Court created a framework 
favoring public policy rather than legal sense.  Building on the general 
proposition that only supervisors could cause employees economic damage, 
the Court held that employers were liable when supervisors created hostile 
work environments.146  This rule has satisfactorily guided courts in analyzing 
hostile work environment claims, but it is based on the legal fiction that only 
supervisors can cause employees economic damage. 
Basing a legal framework on legal fiction is not damaging on its own.  
The Court decided Ellerth to address a specific subset of employment 
discrimination law: an employer’s vicarious liability for hostile work 
environments.  The framework presupposes that creating a hostile work 
environment is not conduct within the scope of an agent’s employment, and 
it moves to address situations where individuals are harassed without the 
company’s input.147  In addressing direct employer discrimination, the 
framework is simply referring to its catch-all, a point where analysis within 
the framework should end.148  It is not attempting to re-write thirty years of 
evolving Title VII case law.  Creating legal fiction with clear-cut boundaries 
is not damaging to a legal area’s evolution. 
But the Ellerth Court clearly did not intend for Ellerth to address 
causation limits for the entirety of employment law.  The notion that “[o]nly 
supervisors can fire employees” is not a holding, nor does it even rise to the 
level of dicta.149  It is at best an overgeneralization, one whose application to 
employment law is rightfully limited to the framework it created. 
 
 145  Id. at 422. 
 146  See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 762 (1998). 
 147  Id. at 761–62. 
 148  See id. at 765 (noting that a lack of any tangible employment action gives employers 
a previously unavailable affirmative defense). 
 149  See id. at 762 (noting a general proposition that “only a supervisor, or other person 
acting with the authority of the company, can cause this sort of injury.”). 
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Numerous circuits correctly dismissed the generalization when they 
advanced cat’s paw causation.150  Their use of the term “supervisor” did not 
reflect an intention to expand Ellerth’s limited holding to cases outside the 
hostile work framework.  The circuits were simply referring to employees as 
supervisors whose job descriptions included filing reports on other 
employees.151  Perhaps they could have called them “overseers.” 
The Staub court correctly dismissed the Ellerth generalization in 
holding that “[a] ‘reprimand . . . for workplace failings’ constitutes conduct 
within the scope of an agent’s employment.”152  In holding an employer 
vicariously liable for employees’ “supervisory” acts, when those employees 
did not meet the Ellerth supervisor requirements, Staub acknowledged that 
its holding was outside the Ellerth framework. 
Attaching the Vance holding to Staub’s cat’s paw unacceptably dilutes 
the cat’s paw.  The First Circuit’s failure to bifurcate the Vance supervisor 
from Staub weakens the class of supervisor to which vicarious liability is 
attached.153  A supervisor whose very job is to report on an employee’s 
progress can purposefully affect the employee’s firing through doctored 
reports.  But no liability can attach unless the employer had reason to know 
that he was biased.  The First Circuit’s adoption of the Vance’s definition of 
“supervisor” is an outright rejection of Staub and the Supreme Court’s theory 
of cat’s paw liability. 
The First Circuit based this rejection on the notion that “the language 
of Vance” applies to all forms of harassment, including harassment that ends 
in a tangible employment action.154  Vance may include in its conception of 
harassment those cases where the harassment culminates in a tangible 
employment action.155  However, it bases this broad definition of harassment 
on a framework-specific presumption from Ellerth that only “supervisors” 
could cause tangible employment actions, a presumption that the First 
 
 150  See e.g., Potence v. Hazleton Area Sch. Dist., 357 F.3d 366, 370 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(establishing a cat’s paw liability similar to the Second Circuit); Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 
572, 583 (5th Cir. 2003) (establishing a two-part test for subordinate bias liability); EEOC v. 
Liberal R-II Sch. Dist., 314 F.3d 920, 926 (8th Cir. 2002) (establishing a cat’s paw liability 
test similar to the one established by the Second Circuit); Rose v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 257 
F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2001) (establishing that cat’s paw liability exists in the Second Circuit 
when an employee has significant influence over the decision-making process); Maarouf v. 
Walker Mfg. Co., 210 F.3d 750, 752 (7th Cir. 2000) (establishing a form of proximate cause 
liability in the Seventh Circuit); Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 
355 (6th Cir. 1998) (establishing a causal nexus test for cat’s paw liability). 
 151  See Laxton, 333 F.3d at 583. 
 152  Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 423 (2011) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 798–99 (1998)). 
 153  Velázquez-Pérez v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., 753 F.3d 265, 273 (1st Cir. 
2014). 
 154  Id. 
 155  Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013). 
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Circuit invalidated.156 
The Second Circuit does not mention Vance but cites Velázquez-Pérez 
and the Ellerth framework approvingly in establishing a baseline negligence 
standard for co-worker cat’s paw liability.157  In doing so, the Second Circuit 
falls into the same trap of extending cat’s paw liability to co-workers under 
a framework established on the proposition that only supervisors have the 
apparent power to cause tangible employment actions.  This apparent power 
did not mean that co-workers cannot instigate tangible employment actions, 
but only that the actions and words of supervisors with express power over 
hiring and firing are more implicitly threatening.  This is the distinction that 
the Ellerth harassment framework is designed to tackle. 
C. Velázquez, Vasquez & The Co-Worker Cat’s Paw 
This article argues for two supervisors in one case.  In Velázquez-Pérez, 
Martinez was certainly not a supervisor under the Ellerth framework when 
she sexually harassed Velázquez-Pérez.  Her persistent lobbying efforts to 
get him fired are evidence that her words and actions did not constitute the 
implicit threats which the Ellerth framework wards against.  Her employer 
had not granted her sufficient, express firing authority that she could wield 
over Velázquez in the workplace.158  But that finding should not preclude a 
Staub analysis because her employer had clearly granted her sufficient 
authority within its decision-making mechanism to cause the firing. 
In Vasquez, the opposite may have been true.  Gray may very well have 
been a supervisor under the Ellerth framework.  Empress had strong reason 
to suspect Gray’s discriminatory intent but did not conduct any investigation, 
thus de facto “delegat[ing] the power to take tangible employment actions 
to” Gray.159  Under Vance, Gray was a sexually harassing supervisor who 
took an adverse employment action against Vazquez.160  Empress should be 
held vicariously liable under the Ellerth framework. 
But Vasquez did not plead that the total lack of an independent 
investigation effectively made Gray a Vance supervisor.  Rather, Vazquez 
pleaded retaliation and the cat’s paw, and Staub does not necessarily 
 
 156  Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998); Velázquez-Pérez, 753 F.3d at 
274 (“[A]n employer can be held liable under Title VII if: the plaintiff’s co-worker makes 
statements maligning the plaintiff, for discriminatory reasons and with the intent to cause the 
plaintiff’s firing; the co-worker’s discriminatory acts proximately cause the plaintiff to be 
fired; and the employer acts negligently by allowing the co-worker’s acts to achieve their 
desired effect though it knows (or reasonably should know) of the discriminatory 
motivation.”).   
 157  Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv., 835 F.3d 267, 270 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 158  Velázquez-Pérez, 753 F.3d at 272–73. 
 159  Vance, 570 U.S. at 447. 
 160  See Vazquez, 835 F.3d at 269–70.  
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preclude her claim.161  Under Staub’s cat’s paw, a dichotomy between 
supervisors and co-workers is unnecessary and oddly placed.  Employers are 
liable under a cat’s paw theory of liability when (1) “a supervisor performs 
an act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to 
cause an adverse employment action, and (2) that act is a proximate cause of 
the ultimate employment action.”162  Yet, Staub’s supervisors took advantage 
of reporting and disciplinary measures that are often made available to the 
entirety of the workplace.163  Indeed, one of Staub’s co-workers, Angie Day, 
complained to human resources about his frequent absences.164  It is entirely 
possible that her comments could constitute the proximate cause that Justice 
Scalia envisioned.  And, in Vasquez, Gray’s actions were presumably only 
feasible because he took advantage of Empress’ sexual harassment policy or 
reporting system. 
There are significant real-world consequences to a cat’s paw without a 
supervisor/co-worker dichotomy.  Such a broad cat’s paw could expose 
employers to massive liability.  Employers may become more hesitant to 
credit the opinions of low-level employees, and workplace cohesion might 
suffer.  Accordingly, this article does not argue against the possibility of a 
negligence-based cat’s paw doctrine.  In fact, it would be entirely plausible 
for courts to hold that co-workers cannot take advantage of the employer-
employee relationship for the purpose of cat’s paw.165  This article argues 
only against the implementation of the co-worker cat’s paw created in the 
First and Second Circuits, which would apply a specific framework’s limited 
terms of vicarious liability to an entire field of law.  Vance’s holding should 
be limited to the framework from which it is derived, and the cat’s paw 
should not be reversed, absent a Supreme Court decision holding otherwise. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The First and Second Circuits have ostensibly reversed cat’s paw 
liability.  In attempting to overcome Vance’s strict “supervisor” definition, 
the circuits empowered the cat’s paw to reach the discriminatory actions of 
co-workers.  But in doing so, the circuits have unnecessarily adopted a 
framework which negates cat’s paw liability in a majority of cases. 
This article advocates for a strict interpretation of Vance:  limiting its 
supervisor exception to the Ellerth framework, which presupposes several 
generalizations, most importantly the non-existence of Staub cat’s paw 
liability.  Title VII employment law does not require, nor should it want, a 
 
 161  Id. at 274–78. 
 162  Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011) (emphasis in original). 
 163  Id. at 414–15. 
 164  Id. at 414. 
 165  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (AM.  LAW INST. 1958). 
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universal definition of supervisor.  If one is desired, Congress should amend 
Title VII. 
The Ellerth framework is designed to deal with a specific type of injury 
and concerns itself with the specific employees especially attuned to causing 
that injury: those employees who seemingly have the power to take tangible 
employment actions at will.  The cat’s paw theory of liability is concerned 
with another employee, the employee with the power, patent or latent, to 
influence the final employment actions of his employer.  In bifurcating the 
two lines of cases and their respective supervisors, this article acknowledges 
the different statutory histories and legal uses of cat’s paw and hostile 
workplace liability.  It now asks the circuit courts to do so as well. 
 
